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This paper looks at how, at an institutional level, the EU’s perception of and strategy 
towards Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has evolved over the past de-
cade. I contend that the EU was quite receptive to Chinese OFDI at the beginning of the 
decade, due to both ideological leanings and the economic context of a post-crisis Europe. 
I then illustrate how the EU slowly adopted a more guarded and critical approach towards 
Chinese OFDI. This paper will focus specifically on four key issues surrounding Chinese 
OFDI policy: national security, technology transfers and IP theft, state support for Chinese 
firms, and market access, ultimately arguing that bilateral investment treaty (BIT) negotia-
tions and the new EU investment screening mechanism are the main policy levers being 
used to address these concerns. For the sake of this paper, I will use the OECD’s definition 
of OFDI.
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1. Introduction
The rise in Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) into the EU over 
the past decade has been truly remarkable. Prior to the global financial crisis (GFC), which 
mired most of the Eurozone in economic stagnation, China’s level of investment in the EU 
was negligible. In fact, from 2004 to 2008, Chinese OFDI in Europe totaled less than $1 bil-
lion annually. However, in the wake of the crisis, Chinese investment into the EU tripled, 
as roughly $3 billion entered the EU from China in both 2009 and 2010 (Meunier, 2014a). 
This explosion of investment continued into the next decade, with inflows again tripling by 
2012 and eventually peaking at $41 billion in 2016 (Hanemann et al., 2019).
Figure 1. Value of Chinese OFDI into the EU by Year
                      Source: Hanemann et al. (2019)
As Chinese FDI into the EU has skyrocketed, it has been met with increasing skep-
ticism and trepidation. In the immediate aftermath of the GFC, Chinese OFDI was wel-
comed with open arms across the bloc. This was especially true in the debt-saddled Mediter-
ranean economies which were in desperate need of capital infusion to jumpstart economic 
recovery. However, at an institutional level, the EU has toughened its stance on foreign 
investment as it relates to national security, technology transfers, state support, and unrecip-
rocated market access over the past decade. In fact, as a direct reaction to perceived Chinese 
economic assertiveness across the continent and beliefs in an unequal playing field for EU 
firms vis-à-vis their Chinese competitors, the EU now is in the process of implementing a 
foreign investment screening mechanism and a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with Bei-
jing. 
2. Initial Stance Towards Chinese Fdi
The EU’s openness to Chinese OFDI over the past decade is unsurprising given the 
bloc’s level of openness to investment overall. According to the OECD’s FDI Regulatory 
Restrictiveness Index (FDI RRI), many EU countries ranked amongst the most open in the 
world in 2010 and continue to be ranked near the top currently (OECD, 2019; Zhang & 
Van Den Bulcke, 2014). Most EU countries are particularly lenient in regards to pre-estab-
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lishment investment conditions, such as screening and ownership policies, and are ranked 
well above both the US and the OECD average in terms of overall restrictiveness. In fact, as 
their rankings in the FDI RRI suggest, only a handful of EU countries had any sort of FDI 
screening mechanism in place prior to 2012 (Meunier, 2014b). The ideological aversion 
towards investment restrictiveness across the bloc was perhaps best summed up by Karel De 
Gucht (2012), who as European Commissioner for Trade in 2012 stated that “European 
security screening of new investments is neither desirable nor feasible.”  
Chinese investment in the EU following the GFC did not initially challenge the 
bloc’s stance towards unfettered openness to FDI. In fact, to the contrary, the euro crisis 
softened political resistance to Chinese investment. Long-term concerns over the quan-
tity and destination of Chinese OFDI were trumped by short-term economic concerns, 
such as reeling in unemployment and finding buyers for IMF-mandated privatization plans 
(Meunier, 2019). Thus, Chinese investment was courted across the EU, with countries 
such as Hungary going as far as to offer citizenship by investment (De Beule & Van Den 
Bulck, 2010). Even France, a country which has traditionally been more cautious towards 
inward foreign investment, was receptive of Dongfeng’s 2014 investment into floundering 
Peugeot (Meunier, 2019). As a result of EU openness to Chinese investment, Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms capitalized on the economic opportunities in 
the EU, snapping up real estate and undervalued European firms alike. Though European 
leaders understood that Chinese FDI in Europe could present possible long-term concerns, 
the short-term benefits of Chinese capital for domestic economies took precedence. Once 
again, Karel De Gucht’s (2012) reminder, “let us be frank: we need the money,” seemed to 
represent the zeitgeist in a still-recovering Europe.
Despite an EU-wide prioritization of economic recovery, of which an infusion of 
Chinese capital was an important piece, concerns over the size and scope of Chinese OFDI 
began gaining traction across the bloc. Though there is a dearth of extensive public opinion 
data regarding European perceptions of China, a poll commissioned by the BBC in 2011 
found that negative perceptions of China’s economic practices were on the rise in a number 
of major EU countries (Rising Concern about China’s Increasing Power, 2011). In comparison 
with a poll from 2005, negative perceptions of China’s economic growth have increased by 
22 points in France, 10 points in both Germany and Italy, and 7 points in the UK. While 
most respondents identified unfair trade practices as their primary gripe with China, think-
tankers and EU bureaucrats were becoming increasingly concerned with Chinese invest-
ment practices. For example, a European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) policy 
brief entitled “The Scramble for Europe” warned against China’s “exploitive” investment 
practices in post-crisis Europe and called for a more coordinated approach to managing 
incoming Chinese FDI (Godement et al., 2011). In a letter written to EU Commission 
President José Manuel Barroso, Commissioners for Industry and Entrepreneurship, Antonio 
Tajani, and the Internal Market, Michel Barnier, voiced similar concerns over the explo-
sion of Chinese (as well as Russian) OFDI. In particular, the two Commissioners implored 
Barroso to consider a supranational body to vet foreign investment into the bloc as a way to 
protect critical European technology (Meunier, 2017). 
Calls for caution towards Chinese investments in the EU became more prevalent as 
Chinese firms redoubled their investment efforts and a handful of major Chinese invest-
ments fell through. As previously noted, prior to the GFC, Chinese investment into the EU 
was negligible, and from 2010 to 2016 there has been only one year (2013) in which the 
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quantity of Chinese OFDI into the EU did not increase markedly. The novelty of Chinese 
investment into the EU as well as the rapidity with which it has grown, is, in itself, a source 
of anxiety for many Europeans (Meunier, 2019). Numerous authors have drawn the com-
parison between contemporary European fears of Chinese investment with American fears 
over the explosion of Japanese OFDI in the US in the 1980s (Meunier, 2019; Milhaupt, 
2008; Zakaria, 2019) or even French concerns over the pervasion of American consumerism 
in the 1990s (Kuisel, 2011). 
Yet, critical attitudes towards the influx of Chinese capital were not solely visceral and 
protectionist reactions to the novelty of Chinese OFDI. A number of high-profile, unsuc-
cessful Chinese investments in the EU put Chinese investment practices under the micro-
scope, calling into question the motivations of Chinese firms and their level of entanglement 
with the Chinese government. For example, in 2010, Tianjin Xinmao withdrew its bid for 
Dutch fiber optic cable company, Draka, after receiving significant pushback from Dutch 
parliamentarians who saw the proposed takeover as an attempt to siphon-off key European 
technology (Zhang & Van Den Bulcke, 2014). Competition concerns were raised most 
notably during COVEC’s (Chinese Overseas Engineering Company) unfinished highway 
project in Poland, in which they were able to win the construction contract with a 30-50% 
lower bid price than competitors, and a 2012 EU investigation into Huawei and ZTE for 
receiving unacceptable government subsidies (Zhang & Van Den Bulcke, 2014). All of 
these cases did little to paint Chinese investment in a positive light and pushed the EU to 
take a more critical stance towards Chinese investment. 
3. Evolution Of The Eu’s Position
The evolution of the EU’s position towards China can be seen most clearly in their 
official strategy documents regarding China. More specifically, from 2013 to 2019, the EU’s 
rhetoric vis-à-vis China has taken on a tougher and more pragmatic tone. In 2013, the EU 
and China released the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, a sixteen page, 
jointly-adopted document which identifies a variety of policy areas for future cooperation, 
ranging from peace and security to people-to-people exchanges. As would be expected in a 
jointly-adopted document, the tone is quite amicable. There are a number of specific goals, 
especially in terms of economic policy, that directly address EU concerns with China, yet 
they are articulated in a hopeful and non-accusatory way. For example, rather than state that 
China is using shoddy regulatory standards as a pretense for limiting market access for EU 
goods, the agenda states that both the EU and China “confirm their commitment towards 
international standardization and notification of any standards-restricting market access” 
(European External Action Service, 2013).
Though the EU has reaffirmed its support for the policy agenda laid-out in the EU-
China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, in 2016, the Commission found it necessary 
to release a document entitled “Elements for a new EU strategy on China” in 2016. The 
tone of the strategy document is undoubtedly firmer than the 2013 agenda, with the EU 
recognizing the importance of putting “its own interests at the forefront in the new relation-
ship” and of the “constructive management of differences” (European Commission, 2016). 
Moreover, the 2016 strategy document directly calls out many of China’s problematic eco-
nomic practices which were alluded to in the 2013 agenda. In particular, “Elements for a 
new EU strategy on China” emphasizes China’s lack of progress in implementing market-
based reforms that open the Chinese economy to foreign firms as well as the lack of “free 
market principles” that guide Chinese OFDI in the EU (European Commission, 2016). 
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However, the 2016 strategy document falls short of being completely adversarial. The EU 
firmly highlights areas of concern with the state of the EU-China economic relationship, 
without presenting the points of contention as unreconcilable differences. 
The EU’s most recent strategy paper regarding China, released in March of 2019, 
is its most forceful and pragmatic yet. The document, entitled “EU-China—A strategic 
outlook,” proposes first and foremost a “further EU policy shift towards a more realistic, 
assertive, and multi-faceted approach” (European Commission, 2019). It is the first policy 
document that explicitly labels China as an “economic competitor” and a “systemic rival 
promoting alternative modes of governance,” and instead of simply imploring China to 
reform its policies, the document considers ways in which the EU can respond to China’s 
obstinance. For instance, the Commission advocates the adoption of a newly reformed EU 
public procurement mechanism that “levels the playing field” with China (European Com-
mission, 2019). But most importantly, the Commission’s latest China strategy document 
is suggestive of a marked change in perception towards China. While the EU continues 
to harp on many of the same policy concerns that have been voiced for over a decade, it 
seems to conceptualize its relationship, especially its economic relationship, with China in a 
more realistic way. The EU recognizes that if China has failed to implement a broad set of 
market-based reforms, which benefits Chinese domestic industry at the expense of the EU, 
prospects for future reform are dubious. 
This shift in the Commission’s view towards China’s economic policies—from hope-
ful and patient to more pessimistic and adversarial—has been amplified in the past year. The 
Federation of German Industries (BDI), in a recent study, contends that “for a long time it 
looked as if China would move towards the liberal, open-market economies of the West by 
integrating into the world economy and reshaping its economic system. This theory of con-
vergence is no longer tenable” (Bundesverban der Deutchen, 2019). The BDI’s perspective 
is shared by European leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel, and Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, who in 2019 decried the 
EU’s naivety vis-à-vis China’s economic practices (Blenkinsop & Emmot, 2019). Macron 
in particular addressed concerns over Chinese OFDI in the EU, labelling China’s rapid ac-
quisition of EU infrastructure as a “strategic error” on the EU’s part (ibid). 
4. Specific Concerns With Chinese Economic Policy
While the growing discontent with China’s economic policies, as reflected in the 
various EU strategy documents and statements by certain European leaders, does not center 
solely around Chinese investment practices, Chinese OFDI in the EU has brought many of 
the EU’s concerns to the forefront. At the most basic level, the EU has begun to realize that 
the usual benefits of foreign investment for the recipient economy may not be materializing. 
When addressing the issue of Chinese FDI in the EU in 2012, De Gucht (2012) reiterated 
what was thought to be common knowledge in FDI literature: foreign investment would 
increase trade and economic activity with the country of origin and the recipient economy 
would gain technological, organizational, and managerial skills. But as has become increas-
ingly clear, China’s motivation for investing in more advanced economies than its own 
is to acquire technology and managerial knowhow for its own firms. The “reverse flow” 
phenomenon is true for high-tech sectors, many of which are included in the Chinese gov-
ernment’s “Made in China 2025” plan, as well as in less geostrategic areas such as soccer 
(Meunier, 2019). In the past decade, China has made a huge push to develop its domestic 
soccer league and turn the country, in the words of Xi Jinping, into a “soccer powerhouse” 
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(as cited in Gibson, 2016) To help achieve this goal, China has attracted high-profile foreign 
players to its domestic league and acquired a number of major European clubs, such as one 
of Italy’s most historic and successful clubs, Internazionale. 
Chinese FDI in the EU has elicited some of the harshest backlash because of the possi-
bilities for technology transfer. The specter of Chinese firms acquiring European technology 
leaders as a way to upgrade its industrial capabilities at Europe’s expense is one of the EU’s 
biggest concerns. The “Made in China 2025” policy has the explicit goal of moving China 
up the value chain in ten important industry sectors, and acquiring the requisite technology 
to do so is a key part of the equation. With these motivations in mind, Chinese acquisitions 
of European tech firms have raised a number of hackles. Predictably, some of the biggest de-
nunciations of Chinese technology transfers have come from Germany, which sees itself as a 
direct competitor to China in terms of the production and exportation of high-tech goods. 
For example, Kuka Robotics’ takeover by Chinese firm Midea was met with considerable 
resistance, with many German officials and business leaders seeing it as a hollowing out of 
Germany’s tech industry (Economy, 2018). 
The fear of losing a technological edge in part due to forced technology transfers is 
a fear grounded in reality. A 2019 survey of 585 European businesses from the European 
Chamber of Commerce found that more than 20% of respondents and 30% of respondents 
in high-tech sectors “felt compelled to hand over technology to Chinese business partners” 
(Weinland, 2019). Perhaps of even greater concern is that the percentage of firms who 
have felt compelled to transfer technology to Chinese partners has doubled from two years 
ago. In some cases, Chinese firms have even reverted to intellectual property (IP) theft 
rather than coercion to obtain key technologies. IP theft has been a long-held concern of 
EU member states, as well as the US. Despite Chinese assurances that they are working to 
fight against IP theft and the fact that specialized courts meant to handle IP theft cases have 
existed in China since 2014, EU firms continue to have proprietary secrets stolen (Zakaria, 
2019). A recent notable example is the theft of IP from Dutch firm ASML, which makes 
lithography systems that trace the circuitry of semiconductor chips. Documents from a 2018 
court case showed that six ASML employees, all with Chinese names, shared secret software 
process information with ASML’s Chinese competitor, XTAL. Unsurprisingly, XTAL’s 
parent company, Dongfang Jingyuan, has close ties with the Chinese Ministry of Science 
and Technology (Doffman, 2019).
Even in cases where technology transfers are not a major concern, EU firms feel ag-
grieved that government support for Chinese firms is partially responsible for takeovers. 
While the EU has a stringent competition policy that prohibits member states from aiding 
or subsidizing private firms except for in very specific conditions, Chinese firms, both SOEs 
and private firms, often receive state support in their business dealings. This “unfair playing 
field” has been noted by the EU in its strategy documents regarding China, and also once 
again by the BDI (2019), who assert that foreign takeovers by Chinese firms are aided by 
“low-cost loans from state-owned banks and direct project-based financing through the 
state budget and state venture capital” (p. 23). The Chinese government has also helped 
Chinese firms acquire European firms in more problematic ways, such as the near-takeover 
of semiconductor company Aixtron by Chinese investment fund Fujian Grand Chip. In 
2015, Chinese firm Sanan Optoelectrics, which has connections with both Fujian and the 
Chinese government, cancelled a large order at the last minute, causing Aixtron’s stock to 
crash and opening the door for Fujian to submit a bid to acquire Aixtron (Meunier, 2019). 
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The acquisition fell through only after the German government withdrew its approval of 
the takeover under US pressure.
Another way in which the EU feels that the playing field is unfair for EU firms is 
in the lack of reciprocal access to Chinese markets. While the EU has given China nearly 
unrestricted access to one of the world’s largest markets, China has been slow to provide 
similar levels of market access for EU firms in China. Once again, the EU expected that 
increased levels of Chinese FDI in the EU would open the door for EU firms to invest in 
China (De Gucht, 2012), but a litany of market-access restrictions are in place for EU firms. 
Some restrictions are direct, such as simply not allowing foreign firms to penetrate certain 
sectors, such as fintech. In other cases, market access is restricted in less overt ways, such as 
by requiring EU firms to launch joint ventures with Chinese counterparts; strict localization 
requirements, including for data; limiting foreign access to government-funded programs; 
applying strict and sometimes inconsistent regulatory standards on foreign goods; and a lack 
of transparency in investment protection (European Commission, 2019). An area in which 
the imbalance of market access is particularly acute is procurement policy. Chinese firms 
are able to bid on public projects throughout the EU (and often do so at a lower price than 
any EU firm can), yet most public projects in China are only open to Chinese firms. In fact, 
China has not signed onto the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), 
which would otherwise prevent them from discriminating against foreign bidders. As a re-
sult, bidding for all of China’s mega-projects is administered by the National Development 
and Research Committee (NDRC) and awarded exclusively to Chinese firms (Godement 
et al., 2011).
Finally, Chinese OFDI has presented EU leaders with concerns over national and 
supranational security. In recent years, the EU has begun to recognize that China has su-
perpower ambitions, and many of those ambitions are antithetical to the EU’s interests. The 
EU and China are by no means enemies, but nor are they security allies. Historically, the 
US and the EU are unaccustomed to receiving significant amounts of investment from non-
security allies; indeed, neither the US nor the EU received any investment, let alone traded 
with, the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Meunier, 2019). The murky nature of the 
Chinese government’s involvement with Chinese firms only heightens security concerns. 
It is hard for the EU to gauge whether investments serve purely commercial interests or 
if there are ulterior motives. As previously discussed, these concerns have been manifested 
in the cases of sensitive technology, such a semiconductors, or dual-use technologies. For 
example, Huawei has faced consistent scrutiny from the EU, most recently in a bloc-wide 
5G security assessment released in October 2019 (NIS Cooperation Group, 2019). Or, in 
2018, the German government blocked two potential Chinese investments on national 
security grounds. The Yantai Tahai Group was prevented from taking over an advanced 
manufacturing company, Leifeld Metal Spinning AG, and China’s State Grid Corporation 
was blocked from acquiring a 20% share in 50Hertz, a provider of high-voltage transmission 
systems (Delfs, 2018).
The security dimension of Chinese investments also encompasses critical infrastruc-
ture. Though Chinese investment in European infrastructure, such as the Port of Piraeus or 
a large portion of Portugal’s power grid, was welcomed in the aftermath of the GFC, on an 
institutional level the EU has grown warier. Notably, former British Prime Minister Theresa 
May reviewed the proposed takeover of Hinkley Point nuclear power plant in 2016 by a 
French consortium and the Chinese SOE General Nuclear Power Group (CGN). Though 
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the deal eventually went through, May was considering the security implications of letting 
China have control over UK power production (Meunier, 2019). Concerns with Chinese 
control of critical infrastructure were only heightened with the arrival of China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) in the EU. Though the amount of BRI investment in the EU is 
meager in comparison with the BRI investment in Asia and Africa, it is still viewed by the 
EU as a security challenge. In 2018, the EU went as far as to release its own strategy docu-
ment on improving Europe-Asia connectivity as a way to counter China’s BRI presence 
throughout the EU. The document makes no mention of the BRI, and presents itself as a 
“sustainable, comprehensive, and rules-based” alternative to the Chinese model (European 
Commission, 2018).
5. How The Eu Is Pushing Back On Beijing
The EU’s new Euro-Asia connectivity strategy is just one of the ways in which the 
EU is trying to substantively push back on Chinese FDI, and it remains to be seen what im-
pact it will have on the level of BRI investment in the EU. The EU has been also respond-
ing to its various concerns with Chinese investment in two other major ways: by pursuing 
a BIT, and by implementing a foreign investment screening mechanism. The competence 
of foreign investment policy was transferred from the national to the supranational level by 
the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, and over the past decade the EU has taken more control over the 
bloc’s overall investment policies. Though the specifics of what the term “foreign direct 
investment” means are not fleshed out in the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has taken the initiative 
to negotiate a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) with China as well as, more 
recently, to implement a bloc-wide framework for screening foreign investments.
CAI negotiations, which aim to adopt a BIT between the EU and China, have been 
ongoing since 2013. The CAI was referenced in the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation, and has been a key agenda matter at the annual EU-China summits. The 
overarching goal of the CAI, from an EU perspective, is to level the playing field between 
EU firms and their Chinese counterparts by bringing Chinese policy closer in line with the 
tenets of the Western, market-based economic order. The main priorities of the CAI, which 
have also unsurprisingly been the biggest stumbling blocks in reaching an agreement, are 
to further open up the Chinese market to European FDI and protect investments in China 
(Meunier, 2014b). As previously discussed, China employs a variety of levers to limit market 
access for foreign firms, all of which the EU is keen to address as part of the CAI. EU lead-
ers have voiced their frustration with the slow progress of negotiations, which they hope 
to conclude by 2020, but see ongoing dialogue with China on economic issues as a way to 
sustain liberalization pressures.
The even greater of benefit of conducting a single BIT negotiation between the EU 
and China is that it presents a unified voice to China. Prior to 2013, each EU member 
state had to negotiate a BIT with China individually, which placed the power squarely in 
China’s hands. China could use its greater economic leverage to force concessions out of 
EU member states, especially some of the bloc’s smaller members. Moreover, the lack of a 
unified policy vis-à-vis inbound Chinese FDI means that China can play member states off 
one another, needing investment access to only a single member state to have access to the 
whole EU market (Meunier, 2014b). But by negotiating as an entire bloc, the EU is able to 
eliminate some of China’s bargaining leverage. This has been an EU focus for a number of 
years, and was bluntly stated in their 2016 China strategy document: 
The EU must project a strong, clear and unified voice in its approach to China. 
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When Member States conduct their bilateral relations with China… they should 
cooperate with the Commission, the EEAS and other Member States to help 
ensure that aspects relevant to the EU are in line with EU law, rules and poli-
cies, and that the overall outcome is beneficial for the EU as a whole. (European 
Commission, 2016)
What makes an EU-led BIT negotiation with China particularly powerful is that internal 
interests are aligned quite uniformly in regard to OFDI policy – the desire to gain greater 
market access in China and compete on a more equal playing field with Chinese firms is 
shared across the bloc.
If CAI negotiations represent an attempt to bolster the EU’s OFDI in China, the 
newly announced investment screening mechanism directly addresses concerns with the na-
ture of inward investment from China. Calls for an EU-wide foreign investment screening 
mechanism date back to 2011, when Commissioners Tajani and Barnier brought the idea 
forward in a letter to the Commission President. But it was not until 2017 that the idea of 
a supranational screening mechanism gained enough political momentum for Commission 
President Juncker to propose a framework. Juncker’s proposal gained institutional consensus 
quickly, and in April 2019, the Parliament passed the regulation establishing the new FDI 
screening framework. 
While the adoption of the new framework is once again a positive step in presenting 
a unified EU voice to China, its effectiveness as a tool to protect against Chinese OFDI det-
rimental to EU interests remains to be seen. Unlike the Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the United States (CFIUS), which is a committee given the powers to review and poten-
tially block FDI in the US for national security reasons, the EU’s FDI screening framework 
has no enforcement capabilities. Rather, it is a framework for increased cooperation and co-
ordination whereby EU states can share and request information regarding specific foreign 
investments that potentially impact on their national security and public order (Hanemann 
et al., 2019). Additionally, the new regulation allows the Commission to voice opinions on 
foreign investments affecting multiple EU member states or foreign investments that impact 
the EU as a whole, though these opinions are non-binding for the member state who is the 
beneficiary of the investment (Regulation 2019/452, 2019). When giving its opinion on the 
quality of the foreign investment, the Commission is to pay particular attention to deals in 
sectors such as critical infrastructure, critical technologies and dual-use items, supply of criti-
cal inputs, access to sensitive information, and media. Finally, when considering whether or 
not a deal is “likely to affect security or public order,” the Commission will primarily take 
into account three criteria: whether the foreign investor is directly or indirectly controlled 
by the government of a third state, whether the foreign investor has previously been in-
volved in activities affecting security or public order, and whether there is a “serious risk” 
that the foreign investor engages in illegal activity (Regulation 2019/452, 2019).
Though the regulation explicitly states a stance of non-discrimination against the in-
vestment’s country of origin, it is clear that many of the framework’s provisions address the 
core characteristics of Chinese OFDI in the EU. SOEs still account for a significant share 
of Chinese OFDI in the EU, and a number of Chinese firms have already faced lawsuits 
over IP theft and other illicit business activities. In fact, analysis from the Rhodium Group 
found that if the regulation’s review criteria had been applied to China’s 2018 OFDI in the 
EU, approximately 83% of investments could have fallen under EU scrutiny (Hanemann et 
al., 2019). It is unclear what opinion the Commission would release regarding any specific 
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investment or if member states would comply with the opinion, but clearly the new frame-
work will place Chinese OFDI more squarely under the microscope.
What is interesting to note in this context is that prior to the new pan-EU investment 
screening framework, the EU did have the capacity to review foreign investments in specific 
cases. The European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), which was 
implemented in 2006, allowed the EU to review foreign investments into critical infrastruc-
ture on national security grounds, and the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), which was 
reformed in 2004 as part of EU competition law, allows the EU to block anti-competitive 
M&As (Meunier, 2014b). However, neither the EPCIP nor the EUMR were used often 
to block any FDI into the EU, let alone Chinese FDI. The EUMR has been called upon 
to review potential investments quite frequently, but Chinese firms have seldom been ruled 
against. In fact, in 2011, five deals involving Chinese SOEs looking to acquire major Eu-
ropean firms were reviewed under the EUMR framework, and all five rulings went in the 
favor of the Chinese SOEs (Zhang & Van Den Bulcke, 2014). The EPCIP has seldom been 
used as a framework for reviewing critical infrastructure investments, in part because the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has tended to rule against claims filed under the EPCIP, 
interpreting national security narrowly so as to avoid economic protectionism (Zhang & 
Van Den Bulcke, 2014). The ECJ’s stance has been echoed by others, most notably Com-
missioner De Gucht (2012), who insisted early in the decade that “we cannot accept – in 
Europe or elsewhere – that national security concerns are used as a false pretense to justify 
the protection of vested economic interests.”
6. Conclusion
The new foreign investment screening framework represents a major step forward 
for the EU with regard to confronting Chinese OFDI, but it does not increase the EU’s 
capacity to block investments at an institutional level. If anything, the new framework is 
emblematic of the EU’s change in perception vis-à-vis Chinese OFDI. The EU began the 
decade encouraging Chinese OFDI and denouncing any form of economic protectionism, 
but has recognized the naivety of that position and recently gone as far as to implement a 
screening mechanism with a broad remit. The screening mechanism, as well as the CAI, 
are examples of how the increase of Chinese OFDI in the EU have had a centripetal effect 
(Meunier, 2014b) on the EU: the EU has recognized that Chinese OFDI poses unique 
challenges that are best confronted at a supranational level. This is not to say, however, that 
Chinese OFDI has induced only centripetal pressures on the EU. Though it is beyond the 
scope of this paper, the centrifugal pressures of Chinese OFDI in the EU are acute and have 
the potential to remain a thorn in the side of EU foreign policy if not adequately addressed. 
In order to prevent Chinese investment from having a greater divisive effect on the bloc, it 
is crucial for the EU to build off of the progress of the CAI and the investment screening 
mechanism, continuing to present a strong and unified voice to Beijing. 
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